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ABSTRACT
This article explores the advantages of opt-out plans,
and identifies a critical shortcoming in Copyright’s doctrine
of Fair Use.
The discussion is fueled by a current
controversy: In December of 2004, Google, Inc. announced
its plan to digitally scan thousands of copyrighted books as
part of a massive new digital indexing service. Hedging
against possible litigation, Google provided a free and easy
opt-out procedure for authors who didn’t want their books
scanned. Despite this measure, two major authors’ groups
have sued Google, claiming the opt-out plan imposes an
unfair burden. This article explores the fairness of
established opt-outs in contract law, privacy law, and class
action rules.
Further, the discussion explores how
Copyright already places similar burdens upon authors.
Ultimately, these lessons are applied to the Google Book
Search problem, and an important new Fair Use
consideration is identified.
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INTRODUCTION
In December of 2004, Google, Inc. announced its plan to
copy thousands of books protected by American copyright law.1
Google Book Search (formerly the Google Print Library Project)
would require years of labor, the world’s most advanced scanning
technology, and the cooperation of Harvard, Stanford, and Oxford
Universities, as well as the University of Michigan and the New
York Public Library.2 What was not required, Google believed,
was the express permission of copyright owners.
After being sued by The Author’s Guild in September of
2005, Google offered a public explanation for why its massive
copying project did not constitute “massive copyright
infringement”:3 The project’s purpose was to help people find
books, not steal them.4 When presented with a search query,
Google’s book search engine would look within its full-text
database to locate pertinent titles. Relevant page snippets (only a
few lines long) would be presented to the user, along with
information about where to buy the books.5 Google claimed their
indexing system was protected fair use.6
1

Press Release, Google, Inc., Google Checks Out Library Books (Dec. 14,
2004), at http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html.
2
Id.
3
Press Release, The Author’s Guild, Author’s Guild Sues Google, Citing
“Massive
Copyright
Infringement”
(Sept.
20,
2005),
at
http://www.authorsguild.org/news/sues_google_citing.htm.
4
See Google Books Library Project – An enhanced card catalog of the world’s
books, at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (“The Library
Project’s aim is simple: make it easier for people to find relevant books –
specifically books they wouldn’t find any other way such as those that are out of
print – while carefully respecting authors’ and publishers’ copyrights. Our
ultimate goal is to work with publishers and libraries to create a comprehensive,
searchable, virtual card catalog of all books in all languages that helps users
discover new books and publishers discover new readers.”).
5
See Id. (“When you click on a search result for a book from the Library
Project, you’ll see the Snippet View which, like a card catalog, shows you
information about the book plus a few snippets – a few sentences of your search
term in context. You may also see the Sample Pages View if the publisher or
author has given us permission or the Full Book View if the book is out of
copyright.”).
6
See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAW (2nd ed. BNA Books, 1995). Fair use is a doctrine in American copyright
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Supplementing Google’s fair use claims, however, was an
even more interesting justification: Any copyright holder who did
not want her works included in Google’s index could simply opt
out of the project.7 The search company pledged to honor such
requests, and even created a webpage to facilitate the opt-out
process.8
Against Google’s hopes, the opt-out plan failed to
extinguish the ire of many anxious authors. In September of 2005,
the Author’s Guild said that the opt-out plan “turned longstanding
precedents in copyright law upside down, requiring owners to
preemptively protect rights rather than requiring a user to gain
approval for use of a copyrighted work.”9 Patricia Schroeder,
president and CEO of the American Association of Publishers
(APP), another group that filed suit against Google in October of
2005, claimed that the opt-out plan “shifts the responsibility for
preventing infringement to the copyright owner rather than the
user, turning every principle of copyright law on its ear.”10
law which permits the unlicensed reproduction of copyrighted works under
certain circumstances. The Copyright Act lists the following four balancing
factors for use in determining the presence of fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
7
Information for Publishers About the Google Library Project, (Google, Inc.),
at http://print.google.com/googleprint/publisher_library.html (“If you are a
current Google Print publisher, you can simply upload a list of the books you
don’t want in Google Print . . . . If you’re not a Google Print partner and want us
to avoid your books, you’ll need to provide us with a small amount of
information about yourself as well as a list of the books you don’t want in the
Google Library . . . . We’re happy to remove your book from our search results
at any time, just as we do for publishers of websites. You’ll need to . . . let[] us
know which books to exclude.”).
8
Google Print Library Project Exclusion Registration, (Google, Inc.), at
https://print.google.com/publisher/exclusion-signup.
9
Edward Wyatt, Writers Sue Google, Accusing It of Copyright Violation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005.
10
Press Release, Association of American Publishers, Google Library Project
Raises Serious Questions for Publishers and Authors (August 12, 2005) at
http://www.publishers.org/press/releases.cfm?PressReleaseArticleID=274.
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Traditionally, opt-out schemes like Google’s wouldn’t be
influential in determining whether copying is protected by the
doctrine of Fair Use.11 In part, this is because the issue is
somewhat new within the narrow context of copyright
infringement. Only recently have projects such as Google’s sought
to systematically record such massive amounts of data owned by
such a multitude of parties, that an opt-out plan would be useful.
But as we consider the benefits that might come from Google’s
digital Library of Alexandria,12 the questions are clear: To what
degree should opt-out provisions influence copyright law? When –
if ever– should copyright infer consent from notice followed by
inaction? What are the social, legal, and economic strengths and
weaknesses of opt-out programs? These questions are at the heart
of a fascinating new realm of copyright law that will ultimately
determine how our society indexes and accesses creative works.
The concept of opting-out has already been of great
importance, both in substantive and procedural law. In contract
law, the issue arises when an offeror imposes a burden on offerees
to actively reject offers they don’t wish to be bound to. American
courts encountered this issue as early as 1893, when Justice
Holmes rendered his decision in Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co.,
which concerned whether a recipient of eel-skins had, through his
silent failure to reject the goods, tacitly accepted to pay the seller.
Holmes’ finding of acceptance through silence is currently
reflected in the Restatement of Contracts, which explicitly allows
for acceptance through failure to opt out of an offer.13 Known
11

The doctrine of fair use, for example, does not account for such procedures.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
12
“The Royal Library of Alexandria was once the largest in the world. It is
usually assumed to have been founded at the beginning of the 3rd century BC . .
. .” Said to have been seeded with Aristotle’s own private collection of books, it
is rumored that all visitors to Egypt were once “required to surrender all books
and scrolls in their possession; these writings were then swiftly copied by
official scribes. The originals were put into the Library, and the copies were
delivered to the previous owners.” Wikipedia contributors, “Library of
Alexandria,”
Wikipiedia:
The
Free
Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Alexandria
13
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 69 (1981) (“Acceptance by
silence or exercise of dominion: Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his
silence and inaction operate as an acceptance . . . Where an offeree takes the
benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason
to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation.”).
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today as “negative option marketing,” the contractual opt-out is
widely used by mail-order businesses that send consumers goods
in the mail along with a demand to either return the goods or pay
for them.14
The same issue has recently arisen in privacy law. For
years, Americans have chosen to opt out of telephone solicitations
by paying to have their phone numbers unlisted.15 Aware of
widespread distaste for telephone sales calls, the FTC created the
National Do-Not-Call Registry, which has received over 100
million registrations to date.16 The opt-out approach is also
commonly used for solicitations sent via traditional mail. In fact,
the Direct Mailing Association (DMA), a trade association of
companies that use direct-mail advertising, has received over 3.3
million consumer requests not to receive solicitations in the mail.17
These recent developments dealing with “informational privacy”18
have important bearing on the Google opt-out issue. This paper
will explore why many consider opt-out systems to be superior to
opt-in systems with respect to the indexing and use of consumer
data.19
The Author’s Guild’s lawsuit against Google ironically
presents yet another domain where opting-out is a preferred mode
14

See, e.g, Terms and Conditions of Membership to BMG Music Service, (BMG
Direct) at http://www.bmgmusic.com/global/how_membership_works.jhtml
(“If you want it, do nothing; it will be shipped to you automatically. If you don’t
want it, respond online or through the mail by the date specified. If you receive
an unwanted Featured Selection, return it within 10 days at our expense and we
will credit your account.”).
15
See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, Or No Options At All: The Fight
For Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1065 (“The
percentage of consumers willing to pay for unpublished numbers varies from
state to state. In California, fifty-five percent of residential telephone numbers
are unlisted, while in New York, only twenty-four percent of residents have
unpublished.”).
16
Statement of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras on
the 100 Millionth Number on the National Do Not Call Registry, (The Federal
Trade Commission), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/dncstatment.htm; DNC
Registrations as of Aug 16 2005 at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/050816dnc
registrations.pdf
17
Sovern, supra note 15 at 1068.
18
Id. at 1042 (quoting Jacob Sullum, Secrets for Sale, REASONS, Apr. 1992, at
29, available at http://reason.com/9204/fe.sullum.shtml).
19
See generally Michael E. Staten, The Impact of Opt-in Privacy Rules on Retail
Credit Markets: A Case Study of MBNA, 52 Duke L.J. 745 (2002).
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of operation: class action lawsuits. It is almost comic to recognize
that the very parties who call Google’s opt-out scheme an unfair
burden on authors have instituted a class action requiring authors
who do not wish to sue Google to opt out. Like many class
actions, the suit is governed by Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure20, which requires that all members of a class be
sent notice explaining the nature of the claims and their freedom to
opt out of the suit.21 In contrast to the earlier federal rule requiring
parties to opt in to class action suits, many believe that the current
opt-out scheme has made class action lawsuits more powerful
instruments of change.22 The legal and sociological reasons
supporting this rule shed light on how copyright law might handle
the matter.
Finally, the opt-out question has been addressed in
copyright law itself, under circumstances almost identical to the
Google Book Search controversy. Currently, search engines,
which operate by copying and indexing information online, utilize
an opt-out scheme known as, “webcrawler exclusion.”23 Copyright
holders who don’t want their material indexed by search engines
can place a special text file on their web server titled, “robots.txt,”
which stands as a gatekeeper, instructing automated search
programs not to index some or all of a website’s contents.24
Today, this is the most common method of preventing unwanted
copying by search engines.25
20

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (1998) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
the court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the
circumstances . . . . The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily
under stood language . . . . that the court will exclude from the class any member
who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be
excluded.”).
21
See Class Action Complaint, The Author’s Guild v. Google (Sept. 20, 2005),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf
(showing the applicability of Rule 23(b)(3) to the action).
22
See generally Steven T.O. Cottreau, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of
Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480 (1998).
23
See generally MARTIJN KOSTNER, A STANDARD FOR ROBOT EXCLUSION
(1994), at http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html.
24
Id.
25
The robots.txt standard is widely known by website administrators. While it
appears no formal empirical study has been performed on the matter, the
popularity of robots.txt is recognized by major organizations, such as The
Internet Archive, a prominent non-profit group. See, e.g., Removing Documents
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Common threads connect all of the examples above: In
each case, a centralized entity acts upon a large class of
individuals; Rights are sacrificed, but only slightly so. Costs are
balanced against conveniences, and burdens are placed on those
who seem to best bear the load. This article will explore these
themes, and define the factors that make opt-outs desirable.
Focusing on social, legal, and economic considerations, Part I of
this article will explore the issue with respect to contract and
privacy law. In Part II, the success of opt-out class action rules
will be analyzed. Part III will study the opt-out rule with respect to
copyright, and Part IV will apply the lessons learned in previous
sections to the Google Book Search issue. Ultimately, it will be
argued that opt-out provisions should be considered as a new factor
in fair use analysis.
I.
A.

PRIVACY AND CONTRACTUAL OPT-OUTS

Contracts: Negative Option Agreements

Opt-outs are built on the idea that sometimes, silence
conveys acceptance. In the business world, this assumption has
proven to be ripe for exploitation by opportunists. Nevertheless,
American contract law continues to recognize silence as a
legitimate mode of assent.
An early example of silence as acceptance dates from 1893,
when Justice Holmes (then on the bench of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts) rendered his decision in Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip
Company.26 In this seminal case, the plaintiff, a purveyor of eel
skins, made a shipment to the defendant, who never explicitly
placed an order. The defendant had previously paid the plaintiff
for unsolicited goods, but this time, the defendant kept the goods
but refused to pay.27 Finding the defendant liable, Justice Holmes
stated that “conduct which imports acceptance or assent is
From the Wayback Machine, at http://www.archive.org/about/exclude.php
(“Robots.txt is the most widely used method for controlling the behavior of
automated robots on your site . . . all major robots, including those of Google,
Alta Vista, etc. respect these exclusions.”).
26
33 N.E. 495 (1893).
27
Id.

MATTIOLI

OPTING OUT

OPTING OUT

9

acceptance or assent in the view of the law, whatever may have
been the actual state of mind of the party.”28
Today, Section 69 of The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, states this principle as follows:
§ 69. Acceptance by Silence or Exercise of Dominion
(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his
silence and inaction operate as an acceptance in
the following cases only:
(a) where an offeree takes the benefit of
offered services with reasonable
opportunity to reject them and reason
to know that they were offered with
the expectation of compensation.
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given
the offeree reason to understand that
assent may be manifested by silence
or inaction, and the offeree in
remaining silent and inactive intends
to accept the offer.
(c) Where because of previous dealings
or otherwise, it is
reasonable that
the offeree should notify the offeror
if he does not intend to accept.29
Silence as acceptance is also recognized in the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), which governs commercial transactions
between businesses in almost every state.30
28

Id.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 69.
30
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), regulates commercial transactions in
every state except Louisiana. UCC § 2-606(1)(b) provides that “acceptance of
goods occurs when the buyer . . . fails to make an effective rejection” after
having had a reasonable opportunity to inspect. A similar policy is expressed in
§ 2-327(1)(b), which states, “failure seasonably to notify the seller of election to
return the goods is acceptance. . . .” This is a reasonable policy, because
merchants have usually negotiated before the time of shipment, and “most
relevant contract have been ironed out.” Avery Katz, “Transaction Costs and
29
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By requiring action on the part of offerees, common law
essentially imposes an opt-out. A well-known example of
contractual opt-outs is the “negative option agreement.” This
business device was introduced in 1926, when Maxwell Sackheim
and Harry Scherman began the famous Book-of-the-Month Club.31
The business plan was simple: First, consenting subscribers
received advance notice of the monthly book. If they didn’t want
to buy it, they opted out by mail or telephone – otherwise, the book
arrived at the subscriber’s door, along with a bill.32 Buyers were
spared the time and trouble of searching for good books. For
Sackheim and Scherman, the plan was a fantastically effective
sales device, and launched The Book-of-the-Month Club to
success.33
Today, negative option marketing is most popular with
book, CD, and movie-of-the-month clubs, such as Columbia House
and BMG, as well as cable, telephone and insurance companies.34
By placing an affirmative duty on offerees to avoid accepting
contracts however, negative option agreements create a high
potential for fraud.35 Since the time of Sackheim and Scherman,
the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer
Be Construed as Acceptance?” 9 J. L. Econ. & Org. 77, 94 (noting that in such
common cases, “requiring an affirmative acceptance . . . would add an
unnecessary transaction cost”).
31
See Peter Bowal, “Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option
Marketing” 36 Am. Bus. L.J. 377, 378. The Book-of-the-Month club wasn’t
truly a club, but a business. The Franklin Library, established by Benjamin
Franklin in 1731, is often cited as the nation’s first true book club. In exchange
for ten shillings per year, subscribers enjoyed the grand literary treasures that
their pooled resources could buy. See “A Brief History of the Library Company
of Philadelphia” at http://www.librarycompany.org/instance.htm. Over time
however, and with some notable exceptions such as Oprah Winfrey’s book club,
the term, “book club” has come to refer to businesses that send consumers books
by mail.
32
See Bowal, supra note 31 at 378.
33
Id. Maxwell Sackheim went on to become a highly regarded figure in the
world of advertising. See generally MAXWELL SACKHEIM, MY FIRST SIXTY
YEARS IN ADVERTISING (Prentice Hall 1970).
34
See, e.g., Terms and Conditions of Membership to BMG Music Service, supra
note 14.
35
See, e.g., Children’s Book Publisher to Pay $710,000 to Settle Charges it
Violated Commission’s Negative Option and Telemarketing Sales Rule, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/scholastic.htm (June 21, 2005) (describing
Scholastic Inc.’s agreement to settle after being charged with operating a
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many unscrupulous businesses have abused negative option
agreements by providing consumers with inadequate and
misleading information, or making it difficult and costly to opt
out.36 Victims of these scams have been bound to terms they never
accepted, and goods they never wished for.
American law has sought to curb these threats. Under the
common law of the Restatement, and federal regulations, a buyer
and seller must be involved in an ongoing relationship (such as a
book-of-the-month club).37 Federal regulations also require the
seller to properly inform the buyer of payment obligations and how
to easily opt out. The FTC’s Prenotification Negative Option
Rule38, which applies to negative option agreements offered by
telemarketers, requires disclosure of:
all material terms and conditions of the negative
option feature, including, but not limited to, the fact
that the customer’s account will be charged unless
the customer takes an affirmative action to avoid the
charge(s), the date(s) the charge(s) will be
submitted for payment and the specific steps the
customer must take to avoid charge(s).39
While this rule pertains only to the telemarketing industry, it
reflects the general consumer protection principle that “[s]ellers
must give consumers information about . . . terms and policies,
clearly and conspicuously, in their promotional materials.”40
Despite such regulation, some consumer protection
advocates still object to negative option contracts and contend that
deceptive negative option book plan, in violation of an FTC rule).
36
See generally Bowal, supra note 31.
37
See the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §3009[d]), which prohibits
offers in the form of merchandise from sellers unknown to buyers. The logic
behind this policy can be traced back to the words of Justice Holmes in Hobbs v.
Massasoit Whip, supra note 26.
38
16 C.F.R § 310.3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/legal.htm (click on
“FTC Rules” and navigate to view section 310.3 of 16 C.F.R.).
39
Id. at § 310.3 a(1)(vii).
40
“Prenotification Negative Option Plans” at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pu
bs/products/negative.htm. See also, Linda A. Goldstein, “Shining a Light on the
TSR’s New Negative Option Regulations,” Response Magazine, April 2003 at
54.
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the high potential for consumer fraud warrants a complete ban.41
Why hasn’t their view prevailed? The answer, discussed below,
lies in the economic efficiency and fairness of opt-outs.
B.

Contracts: Analysis of Negative Option Agreements

Unlike other opt-out examples in this article, negative
option contracts directly concern the sale of goods. This presents
an opportunity to rigorously explore the economics of opt-outs.
The following model42 will later be useful in exploring opt-outs in
the world of copyright.
Consider a small mail-order book service. Suppose the
most a buyer is willing to pay for a given book (v), is twenty
dollars. The seller, through her experience in sales, is aware of this
value, and looks for a suitable price to charge (p). In a strict opt-in
system, “book-of-the-month” clubs as we know them wouldn’t
exist; Offer and acceptance would be required for each sale,
compelling the seller to spend money to entice consumers. This
search cost (s) would involve advertising every monthly book to
the public. Distributed, assume this cost amounts to ten dollars
per-book. Interested buyers will incur a small communication
cost, say, two dollars (r) to tell the seller they wish to buy. As a
result, buyers will only purchase if the book is equal to or less than
eighteen dollars ( p @ v – r ). Similarly, the seller can only profit
by charging more than ten dollars – their advertising expense ( s <
p). In an opt-in system, a sale will only occur if the book costs
between ten and eighteen dollars.
The picture is quite different under an opt-out regime.
Here, we can imagine a typical book-of-the-month scenario.
Unlike the opt-in arrangement, buyers need not be stirred into
action by advertisements - they will “buy” books through total
inaction. As a result, instead of spending ten dollars (s) to find
willing buyers, the seller need only spend a small amount, say, one
dollar (w), to inform customers of the monthly title, and how to
opt-out. (This could be accomplished with an email). Buyers will
41

See generally Bowal, supra note 31 at 390.
This model is adapted from one presented by Avery Katz of the University of
Michigan in his 1993 article, “Transaction Costs and the legal mechanics of
Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as
Acceptance?”. Katz supra note 30, at 80-81.

42
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either keep the book and pay for it, or send a refusal (r, set at two
dollars above). In this scenario, buyers will purchase whenever the
book is equal to or less than twenty-two dollars ( p @ v + r ). The
seller will profit by charging anything more than one dollar – the
cost of informing customers ( w < p ). Thus, sales will occur if the
book costs between one and twenty-two dollars. This margin is
clearly wider than the one created by the opt-in system, and will
lead to more transactions. The following table illustrates both
models:43
Opt-out regime
Buyer does nothing

Opt-in regime

Buyer gains: v - p

Buyer gains: 0

Seller earns: p – w

Seller earns: - s

Buyer accepts

Buyer gains: v – r - p
Seller earns: p – s

Buyer rejects

Buyer gains: -r
Seller earns: -w

Sale occurs when

w@p@v+r

s@p@v–r

(1 @ p @ 20 + 2)

(10 @ p @ 20 - 2)

p = price of book (variable)
v = maximum amount buyer is willing to pay ($20)
s = cost of advertising book to buyer ($10)
r = cost for buyer to communicate interest to seller (price to opt-in) ($2)
w = cost for seller to inform buyer how to opt-out (price to opt-out) ($1)
Table 1: Cost comparison of negative option agreements

The conclusion that opt-outs result in more transactions is
supported by empirical evidence. In a recent survey conduced by
the FCC, seventy-two telephone operating companies selling wire
maintenance plans reported an average acceptance rate of eighty
percent under negative option selling plans, as compared with
forty-five percent under normal selling conditions.44 Similarly,
43

For clarity, this model does not account for the advertising costs associated
with enticing consumers to sign-up for opt-out services such as the book-of-themonth club presented here. This model assumes an existing subscriber base.
44
Mark T. Spriggs and John R. Nevin, “Negative Option Selling Plans: Current
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cable television companies have reported thirty-five to forty
percent increases in channel subscriptions under negative option
agreements.45 Profits from these higher sales “can be retained as
higher margins or passed through to buyers in the form of lower
prices, which may increase sales volume even further if more
price-sensitive buyers choose to purchase at the new lower
price.”46
Of course, harm occurs when the price of opting-out is
high. In these cases, consumers are bound to pay high prices for
goods they don’t want. Federal regulations and state common law
attempt to forbid such abuses while permitting negative option
agreements to flourish where they are most valuable - when
communication costs are low, and business search costs are high.47
C.

Privacy: The National Do-Not-Call Registry

In 1781, James Otis famously said, “[O]ne of the most
essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one’s house.
A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle.”48 The notion of one’s home as a
stronghold of privacy was later enshrined in the Fourth
Amendment,49 and has long been a pillar of the American identity.
In the 1980s, however, a new technology threatened domestic
privacy: Telemarketing. Armed with phone directories, troops of
aggressive marketers interrupted the privacy of countless
American homes. The practice was often invasive, annoying, and
sometimes capable of harm.50
Forms Versus Existing Regulations” 15 J. of Pub. Pol. & Marketing 227, 229
(quoting a 1998 FCC survey).
45
Sovern, supra note 15, at 1092.
46
Spriggs, supra note 44.
47
See, e.g., The FTC’s Prenotification Negative Option Rule, supra note 38; The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 69, supra note 29.
48
“In Opposition to Writs of Assistance by James Otis,” available at
http://www.bartleby.com/268/8/9.html.
49
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
50
See, e.g. Sovern, supra note 15 at 1069 (describing the pain of continuing to
receive solicitations for women’s apparel after the death of his wife); See also
Id, at note 191 (““sadness, shattered feeling, family rifts, grief, doubt, and
devastation” cause by direct-mail ads which included handwritten notes from

MATTIOLI

OPTING OUT

OPTING OUT

15

The problem came to a head in the early 1990s, leading
Congress to enact regulations which sought to lessen the number of
unwanted sales calls.51 The Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention
Act directed the FTC and FCC to create new rules and measures
that regulated telemarketing more closely.52 An early approach
forbade businesses from calling people who had previously told
those particular businesses not to call.53 As telemarketing grew
more widespread however, most consumers agreed that this
“company specific” approach just didn’t go far enough.54 In
response, Congress promoted the National Do-Not-Call Registry,
which allows people to opt out of receiving most types of
telephone solicitations.55
The proposed do-not-call registry received overwhelming
support from consumer groups, but some privacy advocates urged
for an even more restrictive opt-in approach, which would prohibit
“telemarketing to any consumer who ha[d] not expressly agreed to
receive telephone solicitations.”56 A fitting name might have been
“The Please-Do-Call Registry.” Pointing to strong consumer
support for opt-in systems in other contexts, advocates urged that
the approach would “more effectively protect individuals’ rights
and ensure that only those who wish to be called receive
solicitations.”57
direct mailer suggesting recipient try anti-aging creams, diet pills and the like;
notes confused recipient into thinking someone they knew had sent them direct
mailer’s ads””) (quoting Larson – citation required).
51
47 U.S.C. s. 227, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) (1991);
The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (TCPA)
(1994).
52
See generally Id.
53
See § 310.4(b)(1)(ii) of the TCPA (forbidding any telemarketer from calling a
person when that person previously stated that he or she does not wish to receive
calls). See also 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(a)-(f).
54
See 16 C.F.R. pt. 310, Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 19 at 4630 (January 29,
2003) (“most find even the initial call from a telemarketer or seller to be abusive
and invasive of privacy.”).
55
See generally The Federal Do-Not-Call Registry at http://www.donotcall.gov.
56
See 16 C.F.R. pt. 310, Federal Register, supra note 54 at 4630 (“Consumer
groups supported the creation of a national “do-no-call” registry, and some
privacy advocates urged the Commission to take an even more restrictive “optin” approach by banning telemarketing to any consumer who has not expressly
agreed to receive telephone solicitations.”).
57
Do-Not-Call Comment by Electronic Privacy Information Center, 3 at
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Rule-makers were not convinced. While an opt-in might
protect more consumers against unwanted calls, the FCC felt that
“establishing such an approach would be overly restrictive on the
telemarketing industry.”58 In public forums held by the FTC, the
point was raised several times that an opt-in system would
“dramatically increase[] costs for businesses” by requiring them to
communicate to millions of potential customers in order to find
those who would want to receive calls.59 In contrast, consumers
could register for free on the opt-out do-not-call registry, and
businesses would be given access at a low cost. Further, it was
recognized that an opt-in system would deprive many consumers
of the opportunity to learn about products of possible interest to
them.60
Fortunately, it seems the rule-makers were right. With over
100 million registrations to date and high consumer satisfaction,
the National Do-Not-Call registry stands as an “enormously
popular” success.61 The analysis below explores the particular
features of telemarketing that lend it so well to opting out.
D.

Privacy: Analysis of Telemarketing Opt-Outs

Consider a business that wishes to use telemarketing.
Under an opt-in “please-do-call” approach, the business would
need to spend a large amount of money to search for customers
who wish to be contacted. These expenses might include
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/epicetal.pdf (“EPIC”).
See also Do-Not-Call Comment by National Consumers League at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/ncl.pdf
58
In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 (CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153),
(July 3, 2003) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/F
CC-03-153A1.pdf
59
Federal Trade Commission Rulemaking Workshop, Session 1: Wednesday,
June 5, 2002, 65 at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/020605xscript.pdf
60
See Id. (“The original question you asked was about why not have specific
opt-in for calls, and I guess the simple answer to that is that the Commission in
that approach is trying to do too much and that in doing too much it is
dramatically increasing costs for businesses and reducing services for
consumers.”).
61
Annual Report to Congress for FY 2003 and 2004: Implementation of the
National Do Not Call Registry, FTC, 3, at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/donotcall/
051004dncfy0304.pdf
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television advertisements, magazine inserts, or soliciting of past
customers.62
Alternatively, in the current opt-out regime,
interested consumers don’t need to be motivated to opt in – they
receive calls by default. Here, businesses are spared high search
costs, and need only spend a small fee to access the National DoNot-Call Registry.63
One might mistakenly conclude that when a high
percentage of individuals wishes to opt out, an opt-in telemarketing
rule is more desirable. The argument goes as follows: If only five
percent of consumers wish to be called at home, why not place the
burden of choice on the few rather than the many? This reasoning,
however, ignores the fact that opt-ins require businesses to spend
large sums of money in advertising.64 In fact, it would be most
expensive to locate the smallest groups of interested consumers.
By spending more money searching for potential customers,
businesses are left with less money to serve existing customers.
This could lead to lower quality goods and services, higher prices,
or, if search costs are high enough, an abandonment of
telemarketing altogether. In contrast, the cost savings provided by
an opt-out could lead to continued telemarketing and possibly
lower prices, greater shareholder returns, and higher-quality goods
and services.
The advantages of telemarketing opt-outs are even more
dramatic when viewed from a social perspective. Assume three
classes of affected individuals: (1) Those who know they want to
be called by telemarketers, (2) those who know they do not want to
be called, and (3) those who are apathetic. Under an opt-in or optout regime where “opting” is free, the burden on groups (1) and (2)
is arguably too negligible to form the basis of a compelling
argument for either mode of operation.65 The truly important
62

At this point, it might be better for the company to simply advertise their
products rather than advertise why consumers should opt-in to a telemarketing
sales service.
63
See Q&A for Telemarketers and Sellers About the Do Not Call Provisions of
the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/dncbizalrt.htm#paying (“Data for up
to five area codes is free. The annual fee is $56 per area code of data (after five),
with a maximum annual fee of $15,400 for the entire U.S. database.”).
64
See generally Jared Strauss, The Do-Not-Call List’s Big Hang-Up, 10 Rich. J.
L. & Tech. 27 (2004), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i4/article27.pdf
65
Opting out is essentially free, while complaining about opting out can become
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individuals comprise group (3). Under the National Do-Not-Call
Registry’s current opt-out scheme, these parties still receive sales
calls. Presumably, some eventually grow annoyed enough to opt
out.
However, some in this group eventually benefit –
telemarketing may inform them of a service or product interests
them. The opt-out system provides these individuals with a benefit
where the opt-in system does not. While opting in shifts the
miniscule “burden” of choice away from those adverse to
telemarketing, it does at a great cost to businesses and consumers.
In sum, the National Do-Not-Call Registry illustrates that
when the cost of “opting” is low and business search costs are
high, opt-outs are the most economically efficient and socially
desirable mode of choice.
E.

Conclusion: Economic Benefits

This section does not advocate the virtues of telemarketing
or book-of-the-month clubs. Rather, the goal here has been to
demonstrate two examples from the business world where the optout succeeds. Like Google Book Search, both telemarketing and
negative option agreements implicate the legal rights of a large
number of individuals, while benefiting many in the process. A
lack of regulation would permit these businesses to violate
personal rights, while opt-in enrollment would freeze valuable
economic activity. Opt-out is a fair and functional compromise
because it saves businesses high transaction costs while respecting
the rights of those who want no involvement.
II.

CLASS ACTION OPT-OUTS

The Author’s Guild and the American Association of
Publishers claim that Google’s opt-out plan shifts an unfair burden
onto authors. In seeking to eliminate this burden, the Author’s
Guild has remarkably and paradoxically replicated it in the form of
an opt-out class action lawsuit.66 Pondering the oddness of this
expensive. Under either regime, individuals in these groups will easily have
their way.
66
See Class Action Complaint, The Author’s Guild v. Google, supra note 21
(discussing the applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) to the
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situation, one is reminded of M.C. Escher’s impossible staircases,
on which one travels upward forever until their wits grow frail.
The true reason for this contradiction however, lies in the power
and equity of opt-out enrollment in the class action arena.
A.

The History of Class Action Opt-Outs

At the birth of class suits during the sixteenth and
seventeen centuries,67 parties did not fluidly join or leave classes
by personal choice. This was because legal ‘classes’ were usually
preexisting communities, such as villagers, parishioners, or
manorial tenants.68 Individual grievances (or liabilities) were
derivative in nature69 and decrees applied to the community as a
whole. Naturally then, judgments in some cases were binding even
on community members who didn’t participate.70 In Brown v.
Vermuden71 for example, a vicar sued for the right to tithe from all
miners in his parish. The miners appointed four representatives to
defend the suit and ultimately lost. Some years later, a miner
disputed his duty to pay the tax, based on the fact that he had not
been a party to the earlier action. The Chancellor held the minor
by the earlier decree, explaining that to do otherwise would result
action).
67
See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, “An Historical Analysis of the Binding
Effect of Class Suits,” 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1862-1885 (describing the
evolution of class suits, beginning in the early seventeenth century). This
detailed and fascinating article provides the backbone for much of the historical
discussion in this section.
68
See Stephen C. Yeazell, “Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a
History of the Class Action,” 77 Colum. L. Rev. 866, 872 (“[E]very sixteenth
and seventeenth-century case of group litigation I have found involves the
members of rural agricultural communities – manorial tenants, villagers, and
parishioners.”).
69
Id. at 871 (“Seventeenth-century group litigation is not about the legal rights
of aggregated individuals but about the incidents of status flowing from
membership in an agricultural community not yet part of a market economy.”)
70
Hazard, supra note 67 at 1865 (“While it is risky to interject modern analysis
into pre-modern situations, it does appear that Chancery in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries felt reasonably confident about the fairness of
adjudicating rights of absentees where the absentees belonged to a preexisting
group and some members of the group were before the court as litigants.”).
71
1 Ch. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676). Brown v. Vermuden is widelycited in works explaining the evolution of class suits.
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in suits “infinite and impossible to be ended.”72 This early account
shows how claim preclusion (res judicata) resulted from the
treatment of a preexisting group as a sort of “set or entity for
procedural purposes.” 73
Despite such early cases, equity courts became uncertain of
the fairness in allowing a suit to proceed with absent class
members (a question of joinder of necessary parties),74 and
whether absentees should be bound after a judgment (a question of
res judicata).75 During the nineteenth century, these concerns
were soothed to some extent by the legal fiction that absentees
impliedly authorized representatives when those representatives
belonged their community.76
Questions of personal choice in class membership during
this period first appeared in suits involving unassociated parties,
such as creditors or legatees.77 As these were not preexisting
groups, it seemed a strain to find implied authorization to
representation on the part of absentees. As a result, decrees in such
cases were often “binding only on those absentees who had, prior
to the litigation, some connection with the representative
concerning the matter in litigation”78 - In effect, those who opted to
associate themselves with the representative.
While a complete study would require volumes, it can
succinctly be said that the ability of absentees to define their
membership both prior to, and following judgment remained
muddy and unsettled through much of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.79 In 1838, Justice Joseph Story attempted to
crystallize the confusion by defining three types of classes: “where
the question is one of ‘common or general’ interest, where a
72

Id.
Hazard, supra note 67 at 1865.
74
Id. at 1866 (“Toward the latter part of the eighteenth century, Chancery began
to apply the Necessary Parties Rule with greater inflexibility.”).
75
See generally Hazard et. al., Civil Procedure (5th ed. Foundation Press 2001)
at 646 (explaining res judicata).
76
See Hazard, supra note 67 at 1877 (explaining that suits were allowed to go
forward with absent parties, if “the representatives appearing as parties were
expressly or impliedly authorized by the absentees to sue or defend in their
behalf”).
77
See generally Id. at 1866-1878 (discussing creditor and legatee bills).
78
Id. at 1878.
79
Id. at 1877 (“The preclusive effect of a representative suit in English
Chancery practice thus stood unsettled in the early nineteenth century.”).
73
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voluntary association is involved, and where the parties are so
numerous that, without regard to any other criterion, it is
impracticable to join them.”80 Unfortunately, Story’s definitions
often overlapped and muddled questions of res judicata further.81
Built upon Justice Story’s work, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure of 1938 inherited many of the same uncertainties. Rule
23 of originally permitted classes:
[w]hen the character of the right sought to be
enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that
the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that
right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the
adjudication of claims which do or may affect
specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law
or fact affecting the several rights and a common
relief is sought.82
Under this formulation, absentees in type (1) or (2) suits could not
define their membership, while absentees in type (3) suits had the
right to opt in, before or after a judgment had been rendered.83
80

Id. at 1879 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS
§97, at 97-98 (2d ed. 1840)).
81
Id. at 1878-1882 (noting that “Story’s treatment of the binding effect of a class
suit decree is tentative and indeed puzzling. His analytical system consists of
categories that overlap. . . .”).
82
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938) (repealed 1966).
83
See, e.g., American Pipe and Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1973)
(“A recurrent source of abuse under the former Rule law in the potential that
members of the claimed class could in some situations await developments in
the trial or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether
participation would be favorable to their interests. If the evidence at the trial
made their prospective position as actual class members appear weak, or if a
judgment precluded the possibility of a favorable determination, such putative
members of the class who chose not to intervene or join as parties would not be
bound by the judgment. This situation – the position for so-called ‘one-way
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Opting in after a judgment, a practice which became known
as “one-way intervention,” amounted to placing bets on a horse
race after it had run. A leading example of this behavior is Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,84 decided in 1961. In that case,
thirty-six named miners sued for themselves and 350 unnamed
miners, seeking damages for antitrust monopoly violations. Only
after the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs were the absentee
miners identified and asked to come forward with claims for
specific damages. Presumably, a negative judgment would not
have been binding on these unnamed parties.
In an attempt to correct the unfairness of one-way
intervention, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee transformed
Rule 23(b)(3) in 1966 from an opt-in to an opt-out. The revised
rule states:
“In any class action maintained under subsection
(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the
class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A)
the court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does not request exclusion may, if he desires,
enter an appearance through his counsel.”85
The Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying this revision
explains that the opt-out approach served a dual purpose: It
provided a means to prevent one-way intervention,86 while also
lessening the likelihood of res judicata questions after the
judgment.87 Distinguished Judge, Marvin Frankel, famously
intervention’ – aroused considerable criticism upon the ground that it was unfair
to allow members of a class to benefit from a favorable judgment without
subjecting themselves to the binding effect of an unfavorable one.”).
84
300 F.2d 561 (CA,1961).
85
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c )(2).
86
See John. E. Kennedy, “Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out,” 25 Ariz. L.
Rev. 3, 17 n82 (explaining the one-way intervention basis for the rule).
87
See 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-106 (1966) (discussing the issue of res judicata

MATTIOLI

OPTING OUT

OPTING OUT

23

summed-up Rule 23’s opt-out by saying it appeared to be
“patterned after the highly successful procedures of the Book-ofthe-Month Club.”88 This change had an instant and dramatic
impact on class formation, and is a “key premise for many of the
basic principles that shape the b(3) action.”89
B.

Collective Action Benefits

The opt-out approach in class action proceedings has
benefits beyond curtailing one-way intervention. Statistics indicate
that most people, either through apathy or lack of information, do
not reply to notice letters. A 2004 survey of class action suits
between 1993 and 2003 reported that “on average, less than 1 [one]
percent of class members opt-out and about [one] percent of class
members object to class-wide settlements.”90 While it depends on
the particular case, it is generally assumed that most who fail to opt
out do so out of lack of motivation.91 (These ambivalent parties
are analogous to the disinterested group discussed in the
telemarketing section earlier in this article). If a class suit only
involved those opted-in, this ocean of ambivalent parties would be
completely lost, possibly leaving the number of supporters “too
disputes after judgment). See also American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“The 1966 amendments were designed, in part,
specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that
members of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be
bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.”); Sarasota Oil Co. v.
Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 483 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1973); Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 391-92 n136 (1967) (“In the
Preliminary Draft the right to opt out was not unqualified; the court could deny
it to a class member whose inclusion was found essential to fair adjudication.”).
88
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 44 (1967). Here, we might say an even better analogy would be found in the
National Do-Not-Call Registry, which, like class actions, presents an opt-out
obligation that doesn’t stem from prior consent. See also Kenedy, supra note 86
at 18 (noting that book-of-the-month clubs present opt-out burdens premised on
prior consent).
89
Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, “The Role of Opt-Outs and
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues,” 57
Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1531.
90
Id. at 1532.
91
See Id. at 1561-1562 (attributing “overwhelming inaction displayed by class
members” to “apathy”).
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small to attract a lawyer for the group.”92 The Supreme Court
articulated this point in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts,93
stating:
Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request
inclusion would probably impede the prosecution of
those class actions involving an aggregation of
small individual claims, where a large number of
claims are required to make it economical to bring
suit. The plaintiff’s claim may be so small, or the
plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would
not file suit individually, nor would he affirmatively
request inclusion in the class if such a request were
required in the Constitution.94
A simple example illustrates how the opt-in approach would
hobble the class device:95 Imagine if a corporation negligently
constructed a product that wronged one million people each out of
one dollar. In an opt-in regime, few would bother spending the
time and effort to reply to notice. Ultimately, the few who optedin would lack the necessary mass to make the corporation pay for
the wrong it had committed. The same scenario under an opt-out
regime would produce an army of silent litigants nearly one
million strong – large enough to correct the wrong and deter future
harm.
C.

Supportive of 14th Amendment Procedural Due Process

The Supreme Court has also recognized the power of optout to establish personal jurisdiction over litigants in state court. In
Shutts, a party’s failure to respond to an opt-out justified a state
court’s jurisdiction over him, even though he did not posses
minimum contacts. The underlying theory suggested by the Court

92

John Bronsteen, “Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal,” 2005 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 903, 909.
93
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
94
Id. at 812-813.
95
See Bronsteen, supra note 92 at 909 (illustrating a similar example).
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was that class members who do not reply to opt-outs implicitly
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.96
The right to opt out also supports the due process rights of
absentees in class suits. In Shutts, the Supreme Court explicitly
refused to provide additional protections “to protect what must be
the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to
execute an ‘opt-out’ form, but whose claim is nonetheless so
important that he cannot be presumed to consent to being a
member of the class by his failure to do so.”97 Conversely, where
opt-out rights are not provided, violations of due process have been
found.98
It is important to note that the right to opt out alone does
not fulfill due process. It is but one thread in a tapestry of
guarantees that, together, give body to procedural due process in
class suits. Specifically, Rule 23(a) ensures congruence between
the named representative parties and the absent parties by
demanding that the “claims or defenses of the representative
parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and that
the they adequately represent the class.99 Further, the detailed
notice requirements of Rule 23 play an essential role in the opt-out
process.
D.

Opting Out as a Check on Counsel

Finally, some commentators posit that opt-outs act as a
market check on the quality of counsel’s representation.100 Unlike
strict opt-ins, opt-outs give counsel an incentive to provide good
representation at the outset of a case, to avoid class attrition.101 A
court relying on this theory would be less burdened to scrutinize
the adequacy of class counsel or representatives.102

96

Shutts, supra note 93 at 812-14 (discussing the issue of due process and
implicit submission to the tribunal).
97
Id. at 813.
98
See, e.g., Molski v. Gleich, 307 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002); West World
Travel, Inc. v. AMR Corp., 218 F.R.D. 223, 241 (C.D. Cal 2003).
99
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
100
See Eisenberg, supra note 89 at 1536.
101
Id.
102
Id.
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Conclusion: Social Benefits

From small agricultural community disputes to massive
corporate litigations, the law has struggled to treat absentees fairly.
The problem has been most thorny in cases where potential
litigants have a choice of class enrollment. The 1966 amendments
to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure flipped the
membership decision from an opt-in to an opt-out largely to curtail
the unfair practice of one-way intervention. But the benefits of
opting out far surpassed this modest goal: By marshaling the
masses that don’t respond to class notification, the opt-out system
enables justice to operate where it could not before. Further, the
opt-out system (combined with its accompanying notice
requirements) works to ensure procedural due process. Finally,
opting-out acts as a market check on representative counsel.
But an even deeper lesson can be learned: While earlier
discussions of substantive law (privacy and contract) showed a
benefit to businesses, the adoption of opt-outs in this area of
procedural demonstrates a benefit to society. The fact that opting
out can serve both economic and social goals will be crucial in
analyzing Google Book Search, which itself possesses this duality.
III.
A.

COPYRIGHT OPT-OUTS

Registration, Deposit and Notice as Opt-Outs

American Copyright law has always placed affirmative
duties on authors. The requirements of registration and notice
have changed since the original Copyright Act of 1790, but remain
important to all authors who value and seek to protect their rights.
It might be a surprise to hear these measures called “opt-outs,” but
fundamentally, that’s just what they are: Affirmative duties that
authors must perform to repel infringement.
In the original Copyright Act of 1790, the requirements of
formal registration and deposit were exhaustive and burdensome.
Commenting on the matter, the former Register of Copyrights,
Barbara Ringer, wrote that “[t]he most obvious and distinctive
feature of the Act of 1790 is its extreme emphasis on compliance
with formalities. . . . The 1790 Act displays an obsession with
punctilios that goes beyond anything in any earlier copyright
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legislation anywhere.”103 A quick look at the Act demonstrates
this point: Section 3 detailed the specific wording that had to be
used upon recordation of deposit,104 and specified that within two
months of publication, authors were to publish a copy of their
registration record in a newspaper for a period of four weeks.105
Failure to satisfy such requirements resulted in forfeiture of
copyright.106
The burden of registration and deposit only grew with time.
In fact, the 1846 Act required a specific procedure by which
authors had to deposit multiple copies of their work with both the
Smithsonian and the Library of Congress.107 Subsequently, the
1909 Act established submission of the correct number of deposit
copies as a predicate both for obtaining registration (in section 11)
and for the commencement of an infringement suit (in section
13).108
Notice requirements have also historically been
burdensome. Introduced in the revised Copyright Act of 1802,
detailed statements of notice originally had to be about one
hundred words in length.109 It was not until 1874 that a shorter
form (consisting of the word, “Copyright,” the year of registration
and the author’s name) was introduced.110 The 1976 Act
introduced the recognizable symbol, © (the letter C inside a circle),
103

JOYCE ET. AL. COPYRIGHT LAW, 417 (6th ed., LexisNexis) (hereinafter,
Copyright).
104
Copyright Act of 1790, § 3 (“And the clerk of such court is hereby directed
and required to record the same forthwith, in a book to be kept by him for that
purpose, in the words following . . . ‘District of --- to wit: Be it remembered, that
on the --- day of --- in the --- year of the independence of the United States of
America, A.B. of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a map,
chart, book or books . . .the right whereof he claims as author or proprietor . . .
in the words following to wit: [insert the title] in conformity to the act of the
Congress of the United State entitled ‘An act for the encouragement of learning,
by securing the copies of maps, chart, and book, to the authors and proprietors
of such copies, during the time therein mentioned.’”).
105
Id. (“And such author or proprietor shall, within two months from the date
thereof cause a copy of the said record to be published in one or more of the
newspapers printed in the United States, for the space of four weeks.”).
106
Copyright, supra note 103 at 417.
107
Id. at 448.
108
Id. at 449.
109
Id. at 435.
110
Id.
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along with the year of publication and the name of the author.111
Until the 1970s, notice requirements were enforced with absolute
strictness. As with registration, “technical failure to satisfy notice
requirements when a work was published could work immediate,
permanent forfeiture of all copyright protection under both state
and federal law.”112
Today, copyright formalities are more flexible, but still
crucial for authors who wish to protect their rights. For example,
although the notice requirement is now optional (a result of the
U.S.’s attempt to conform to international standards), lack of
notice can lead to lowered statutory damages.113 Similarly, while
formal registration and deposit are no longer strict requirements for
copyrightability,114 both are demanded of authors who wish to
bring infringement suits.115
It is plain to see that Congress has long compelled authors
to affirmatively assert their rights. Legislative history shows that a
primary reason behind this policy was to maximize the number of
works in the public domain. A House Report printed in 1976
explicitly stated that historically, a principal function of notice was
that “[i]t has the effect of placing in the public domain a substantial
body of published material that no one is interested in
copyrighting.”116 Maximizing the effectiveness of a system by
involving those who do not assert their rights is a concept that has
appeared in every section of this article. This theme will later be
discussed with respect to Google Book Search. For now, however,
history makes one thing boldly clear: Authors have always had to
act to inhibit infringement.
111

Id.
Id. at 436
113
See 17 U.S.C. § 401(d), § 402(d) (“If a notice of copyright in the form and
position specified by this section appears on the published copy or copies to
which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight
shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent
infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
114
Id. at § 408.
115
Id. at § 411 (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title.”).
116
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 143-44, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5659, 5759-60
112
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‘Robots.txt’ as an Opt-Out

Authors must affirmatively act to protect their copyrights
online. In its youth, the Internet was much like the untamed
American West:117 It was a place of great promise, but very
difficult to navigate. Users could only visit websites they already
knew the names of (i.e., http://www.ebay.com), but were unable to
easily locate new websites. This problem gave birth to the
business of Internet directories and search engines. Like intrepid
explorers of the old west, search computer programs journeyed out
onto the digital frontier, and made records of all the websites they
found. Internet users could then find new websites by telling
search engines just what they were looking for.
To be useful, however, search engines had to copy some of
the content they found online. This clearly raised a copyright
dilemma: How could search companies make information easier
to find without trammeling on the copyrights of website owners?
Although online photographs and literary works are fixed in digital
form, they enjoy the full protections of Copyright.118 That a work
might be stored on a sheet of parchment, a magnetic tape, a
compact disc, or a web server’s hard drive makes little difference
for purposes of copyrightability.119
Ultimately, the problem was solved with an opt-out scheme
known as, Robot Exclusion Headers (“REH”).120 The technology
117

Many people have likened the early Internet to the frontier west, both for its
sense of promise and lawlessness. The phrase “electronic frontier” was most
famously adopted by The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit
organization which seeks to preserve personal freedoms in the digital domain.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation was founded in 1990 by Mitch Kapor,
former president of Lotus Development Corporation, John Perry Barlow,
Wyoming cattle rancher and lyricist for the Grateful Dead, and John Gilmore, an
early employee of Sun Microsystems. A History of Protecting Freedom Where
Law and Technology Collide, (The Electronic Frontier Foundation), at
http://www.eff.org/about/history.php.
118
A work need not be readily perceivable for copyright protection to exist.
What matters is that a work can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17
U.S.C. § 102(a). See also, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp
714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983).
119
Id.
120
See generally MARTIJN KOSTNER, A STANDARD FOR ROBOT EXCLUSION
(1994), at http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html (detailing the robot
exclusion standard).
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is less exotic than the name implies. REHs are brief computer
commands which tell search engines what they shouldn’t copy
from websites. Copyright owners who don’t want their material
indexed store these commands in a text file named, “robots.txt”
which lies at the top-level of a web server’s directory structure.
Today, this is the most common method of preventing unwanted
copying by search engines.121
A quick concrete example of an REH can be found at
photo.net, the popular photography website:
Disallow:
Disallow:
Disallow:
Disallow:
Disallow:
Disallow:
Disallow:
Disallow:

/pvt
/shared
/photodb
/bboard
/learn
/travel
/tv
122
/gallery

The “disallow” command is read by almost all search engines as
the website owner’s desire to opt-out of having their data
copied,123 and the short words preceded by the “/” character are the
names of protected folders.
As the example shows, authors can be very specific in
telling search engines exactly what not to index. For example, a
website operator who has two folders, “public journal” and
“private diary” can list the latter folder in her robots.txt file to
prevent it from being copied. By not naming the “public journal”
folder, the website owner silently consents to it being copied.
This illustrates a unique advantage of the opt-out in the
context of indexing systems. Often, copyright holders may wish to
have some –but not all– of their material included. If web search
engines were forced to operate by means of a strict opt-in, it is hard
to imagine that such fine-grain choices would be possible. An optin in this realm would require search engines to painstakingly and
perpetually contact website operators, to ask for permission to
121

See infra note 25. See also, Eric J. Feigin, Architecture of Consent: Internet
Protocols and Their Legal Implications, 56 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934 (20032004).
122
http://photo.net/robots.txt.
123
Kostner, supra note 120.
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index copyrighted material. For practical purposes, strict opt-in
would be the death of online search.
IV.

GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH

Before analyzing the opt-out issue in Google Book Search,
it is valuable to explore briefly the purpose and significance of the
project itself. A major weakness in traditional book catalogues and
indices is the fact that readers often don’t know how a book has
been categorized. Ignorant of this fact, readers are left to play
guessing games to find what they are looking for. The same
problem exists when searching for information within a single
work.
Google Book Search solves this problem in a novel way.
Rather than requiring readers to guess the proper category that a
work has been assigned to, Google’s index allows users to find
books based on any word or phrase that appears in text. Users
enter phrases into the index, and the system presents a list of all
books that contain those words, as well as vendors selling those
titles.124 Although some authors ask Google to display a few full
pages from their books to help entice readers, most books are not
readable in any true sense.125 All that is provided to help users
understand the context in which their search appears is a one or
two-line snippet of text surrounding their search terms.126 By
allowing the public to locate printed works based on such specific
criteria,127 the project promises to revolutionize the way people
find books.
124

See Google Books Library Project, supra note 5 (explaining how Google
Book Search operates).
125
Id. Users are not able to read full pages or even paragraphs of copyrighted
works. Instead, “snippets” of text are presented to give the user a sense of
context when viewing an indexed work.
126
Id.
127
The way an individual conceptualizes information affects the way they search
for it. Often, indexes reflect one’s unique appreciation and memory of that
work. This fact has been recognized by authors and woven into fictional
narratives. For example, in “The Adventure of the Sussex Vampire,” written by
Sir Arthur Coonan Doyle, the detective Sherlock Holmes searches aloud through
his own index of past matters:
“Voyage of the Gloria Scott,” he read. “That was a bad
business… Victor Lynch, the forger. Venomous lizard or gila.
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Despite its vast potential as a sales vehicle, some authors
object to Google Book Search. These authors claim that, because
the index relies on the full text of books, it impermissibly infringes
on their copyrights.128 Google’s early response to these fears was
to establish a simple opt-out system.129 Authors troubled by the
inclusion of their works within the Google index can easily visit a
website and request removal.130 Authors can also opt out prior to
having their works indexed.131 The opt-out procedure is free,
easily accessible online, and Google’s instructions are clear.132 In
response, two large authors’ groups have instituted class action
lawsuits, claiming Google’s opt-out system represents an unfair
burden.133
It’s likely that this legal dispute will center on whether
Google’s index is protected by the doctrine of fair use.134
Traditional fair use analysis involves the weighing of four factors:
(1) the purpose of the defendant’s use, (2) the nature of the
plaintiff’s copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality
taken by the defendant, (4) the effect of defendant’s use on the
market for the plaintiff’s work.135 These four factors focus on the
substantive fairness of a defendant’s use, but they do little to
Remarkable case, that! Vittoria, the circus belle. . . .Vipers.
Vigors, the Hammersmith wonder. Hullo! Hullo! Good old
index. You can’t beat it.”
Another example appears in the book, “Cat’s Cradle,” wherein the author Kurt
Vonnegut suggests that indexing reflects an individual’s unique perceptions, and
that a great deal can be learned about a person by the way he indexes a book. It
seems the fact that we store information differently often leads us down different
paths in searching for new information.
128
See, e.g., Press Release, The Author’s Guild Sues Google, Citing “Massive
Copyright Infringement” (Sept. 20, 2005), supra note 3.
129
See Information for Publishers, supra note 7.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Press Release, The Author’s Guild, “Author’s Guild Sues Google, Citing
“Massive Copyright Infringement” (Sept. 20, 2005), supra note 3; Press
Release, The Association of American Publishers, “Publishers Sue Google Over
Plans To Digitize Books – Google Print Library Violates Publishers’ and
Authors’
Rights”
(Oct.
19.
2005),
available
at
http://www.publishers.org/press/releases.cfm?PressReleaseArticleID=292.
134
See Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright Analysis,
at http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googleprint.pdf.
135
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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evaluate the procedural fairness of an opt-out plan. This article has
demonstrated that in several major areas of law –including
copyright– the fairness of opt-outs weighs heavily against the
unfairness of activities that some find objectionable. As the
discussion below will show, Google Book Search is a strong case
for the inclusion of procedural considerations in fair use.
A.

Lessons from Contract and Privacy Law

This article began with a discussion of negative option
agreements used by mail order businesses. Introduced by the
Book-of-the-Month Club in the 1920s and still widely in use, this
form of marketing places an unusual burden upon consumers to
affirmatively communicate their desire not to accept goods and
services. Negative option agreements have a demonstrated
potential to harm contractual freedoms.
The National Do-Not-Call Registry is a more recent
example of a similar scenario in the realm of telemarketing.
Where negative option agreements burden contractual freedom,
telemarketing threatens privacy. The older practice utilizes the
postal system, while the more recent system exploits the power of
the telephone.
Despite their potential for harm, both negative option
contracts and telemarketing remain legal. As examined earlier,
this is largely due to the fact that both systems utilize opt-outs.
Consumers presented with negative option offers can easily
communicate their refusals to merchants. Similarly, anyone can
register their telephone number for free on the National Do-NotCall Registry to avoid receiving calls from telemarketers.136 Both
opt-out procedures are free, easily accessible, and simple to use.
The fairness of this procedure dilutes the unfair and objectionable
aspects of both business practices.137
Further, opt-outs benefit consumers by involving those
who, through apathy or indifference, do not assert themselves.
Some subset of individuals in this ambivalent group is likely to
eventually benefit from the goods or services they are offered.138
136

See The Federal Do-Not-Call Registry, supra note 55.
See infra pp. 8-14.
138
The presumed strength behind telemarketing lies in its ability to sell items to
consumers who wouldn’t otherwise purchase those goods.
137
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This involvement directly benefits businesses, possibly leading to
secondary benefits in the form of lower prices, and higher quality
goods and services.
Finally, opt-outs in the negative option and telemarketing
domains save businesses search costs. Under opt-in regimes,
businesses are more likely to spend money motivating potential
consumers to involve themselves. As the formal economic model
presented in Section I illustrates139, the cost of motivating the
public can be high, and it can safely be assumed that the process
takes time. If these transaction costs outweigh a business’s desired
profits, valuable business activity will be lost. In contrast, opt-out
systems spare businesses transaction costs by automatically
introducing products and services to those who wouldn’t otherwise
feel motivated enough to opt in. Our legal system recognizes the
fact that these benefits to consumers and businesses far outweigh
the nominal burden of opting out.
Comparing these examples to Google Book Search, we
follow the historical trend in communications technology from the
postal system to the telephone to the Internet. Like earlier
examples, Google is a business acting upon a large number of
individuals.140
Where negative option marketing threatened
contractual rights and telemarketing threatened privacy rights,
Google’s activity places a burden on copyrights. Functionally,
Google’s opt-out is similar to the National Do-Not-Call Registry.
Like that service, the opt-out form is presented on a webpage that
has been widely publicized.141 The form is easy to find, easy to
use, and free.
Further, it permits both prospective and
retrospective opt-outs. Understandably, Google confirms the
identity of copyright holders who opt-out.142 No matter how
substantively objectionable Google Book Search might appear to
authors, the opt-out procedure is certainly fair by comparable
standards. With these fundamental similarities in mind, we now
139

See infra p. 13.
Currently, Google is the world’s most popular search engine. As their
website states: “Google is the world’s largest search engine and through its
partnerships . . . response to more search queries than any other service online.”
Google
Corporate
Information:
Quick
Profile
at
http://www.google.com/intl/en/corporate/facts.html
141
Google Print Library Project Exclusion Registration, supra note 4.
142
Id. Not doing so could lead to the dishonest practice of competing authors
removing each other’s books from Google Book Search to hinder sales.
140
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consider whether Google’s opt-out shares the economic benefits of
previous examples.
Google Book Search’s opt-out appears to present benefits
to businesses and consumers by securing the involvement of
apathetic individuals. Authors who might feel initially ambivalent
toward Google Book Search have the opportunity to be included
by default. Just as in previous examples, some of these individuals
will benefit from the service - perhaps through increased sales and
exposure online. This additional involvement will promote greater
book sales, and make Google’s index a stronger system for other
authors. In turn, this will likely lead to secondary economic
benefits for Google and advertisers.
By providing authors with the right to opt out, as opposed
to requiring an opt-in, Google avoids the cost of locating and
contacting thousands of copyright holders. The time and money it
would take to locate authors and convince them to opt-in would
likely weaken the book index considerably. If these transaction
costs were higher than Google’s desired profits, the book index
itself would likely be abandoned. Thus, an opt-in could result in
the end of a valuable service.
Google Book Search is the most recent in a series of optout business plans that have threatened substantive legal rights.
The fairness of this opt-out plan is a counterweight against its
allegedly unjust use of copyrighted works. As in telemarketing
and negative option agreements, Google’s opt-out benefits
business and consumers by guaranteeing the involvement of
indifferent parties, preventing needless search costs.
B.

Lessons from Class Action Rules

Turning to class action suits, we shift focus from economic
to social benefits. As discussed in Section II, a major reason
behind the 1966 switch from opt-in to opt-out class action
enrolment rules was the problem of one-way intervention.143
However, the societal benefits of opting-out in the class action
arena far surpass this humble goal. As in the business context, optout enrollment creates collective action benefits by including those

143

See infra p. 22.
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who don’t respond to class notifications. This added inertia makes
opt-out class action suits powerful tools of justice.
Google Book Search possesses a similar potential to benefit
society. As the index grows, readers will have an unprecedented
opportunity to learn about books by means not previously available
to them. Researchers will be able to pinpoint subject matter that
was traditionally hard to find. The technology will also vastly
broaden the horizons of younger readers more comfortable with
search engines than old-fashioned library indexes.
Publishers and authors will reap advantages as well. As
Tim O’Reilly, the well-known publisher of computer books,
recently wrote in a op-ed piece for the New York Times:
A search engine for books will be revolutionary in
its benefits. Obscurity is a far greater threat to
authors than copyright infringement, or even
outright piracy . . . . Google promises an alternative
to the obscurity imposed on most books. It makes
that great corpus of less-than-bestseller accessible to
all. By pointing to a huge body of print works
online, Google will offer a way to promote books
that publishers have thrown away, creating an
opportunity for readers to track them down and buy
them.144
As in class action suits, this force for social good can only
operate successfully with the collective action benefits that come
from opting-out. Under an opt-in regime, Google would be forced
to spend large sums of money searching for and communicating
with rights holders. At the very least, this lost time and money
would make Google Book Search a less powerful tool for society.
These costs might be so expensive as to make the project
nonviable. The massive loss to readers and copyright holders
would vastly overshadow the single paltry benefit an opt-in would
give reluctant authors.

144

Search and Rescue, Tim O’Reilly, New York Times, September 28, 2005
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Precedent in Copyright Law

Contrary to the Association of American Publishers’ claim
that Google Book Search turns traditional copyright law “on its
ear,”145 copyright law has long placed burdens on authors to assert
their rights.
The formal notice, deposit and registration
requirements demand authors to affirmatively act in order to enjoy
the full benefits of their copyrights. Although these requirements
have been weakened since their inception, they still place a duty on
those interested in defending their copyrights.
Even more striking is the fact that opting-out is the primary
way copyright holders protect their online works from indexing
systems like Google’s. Using Robot Exclusion Headers, authors
can specify which material they don’t want search engines to copy.
The indexing of online works would probably not be feasible under
any other arrangement.
The argument that Google Book Search should adopt an
opt-in suggests that copyright law should afford authors of printed
works greater protection than authors of online works already
receive. It’s unclear why this should be so. While some might
argue that those who publish their works online somehow assume
the risk of being indexed, this does not seem to be so: Both online
and print authors share their work with the public, and digital
works are in no way less worthy of copyright protection. The only
true difference between works published online and those
published on paper lies in a method of distribution. There is no
reason why this fact should lead to disparate treatment of two
otherwise identical groups. Ultimately, it is clear that the burden
to affirmatively act is rooted in copyright’s history, and has already
been adopted in a context nearly identical to Google Book Search.
D.

Procedural Fair Use

In the situations reviewed in this article, the opt-out is more
than a mere courtesy or a gift to those who want no involvement.
It is a major force of legitimacy and fairness. Without the opt-out
procedure, many of the activities discussed in previous sections
would be deemed unfair.
145

Press Release, Association of American Publishers, Google Library Project
Raises Serious Questions for Publishers and Authors, supra note 10.
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Google Book Search is a clearly analogous situation. Here,
a central actor acts upon a large group of individuals. The rights of
some are slightly encumbered in the face of economic and social
benefits. At the heart of this project lies an opt-out.
However, the fair use doctrine, which will most likely be
the major test of Google Book Search’s legality doesn’t account
for procedures like opting-out. The fair use doctrine requires a
court to consider:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.146
These factors point to fairness in substance, but do not account for
fairness in procedure. With no legislative framework in place, the
danger exists that courts will ignore opt-outs, or treat the procedure
inconsistently, or as an afterthought. As the examples from this
article demonstrate, opt-outs can be central to the legitimacy of
business practices – not side notes.
Copyright law must consider and weigh the procedural
fairness of opt-outs. Ideally, this could be accomplished through
an amendment to the Copyright Act. The inclusion of procedural
fairness in Section 107 would make it clear that, like other fair use
factors, opt-outs counter-balance what otherwise might be
considered objectionable uses of copyrighted material. Because
opting out deals with the nature of a defendant’s use, it might be
appended to the first fair use factor. Thus, an updated version of
factor (1) might appear as:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes, and including the
existence of mitigating procedures such as opt-outs.
146

17 U.S.C. § 107
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Ultimately, the inclusion of this new factor would provide courts
with a clear means of measuring a critically important aspect of a
defendant’s use of copyrighted material.
In time, more businesses are likely to index analog works
by means similar those employed by Google. Much like the early
days of telemarketing, company specific opt-out procedures might
place an unfair burden on rights holders to opt out from a multitude
of databases. To solve this problem, one can imagine a centralized
opt-out procedure similar to the National Do-Not-Call Registry. A
national “Do-Not-Index” registry of this sort would provide rights
holders with an easy means of opting out of multiple indexing
projects. Copyright holders could either sign up online, or simply
indicate their preference when registering their work.
For future works, opting out would be even easier to
accomplish. The analog equivalent to a “robots.txt” statement
would forgo the need to register future works in an opt-out
database. Just as copyright holders provide notice with the © (the
letter C inside a circle) figure, the desire not to have a work copied
for indexing purposes could be indicated with a
(slash in a
circle) symbol. This symbol (or one like it) would be an extremely
cheap and serviceable means of opting-out.
E.

Conclusion

Opting out has been adopted in several major areas of the
law. It adds fairness and legitimacy to marketing and sales
practices, while generating economic activity valuable to
businesses and consumers. Properly administrated, it does so at
little or no cost to those who wish to opt out. By marshaling the
masses that don’t respond to class notification, the opt-out system
is also a tool for justice in the class action area. Opting out is
rooted in copyright’s history and has already been adopted in the
online context.
There is a common structure to all of the scenarios
reviewed in this article. In each case, a central actor threatens the
rights of a large class of individuals. Negative option agreements
interfere with contractual rights. Telemarketing infringes privacy
rights.
Class action procedures implicate due process
considerations. In all such cases, however, those who fear harm
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have an easy means of avoiding it, and rules have been developed
which dictate standards for notice and proper administration,
ensuring that opt-outs are fair and relatively costless.
The present situation concerning Google is closely
analogous. The importance of opt-outs in contract, privacy, and
class actions demonstrates that Google’s opt-out program is more
than a courtesy to authors; it substantially adds to the fairness and
legitimacy of Google Book Search. While some authors complain
of the burden an opt-out imposes, copyright law has long placed
burdens on authors through formal registration, notice and deposit
requirements. Further, opting out is already a dominant mode of
choice in protecting works published online.
The quality of a meal cannot be determined solely by its
ingredients, but how those ingredients are prepared. The same is
true in determining the legitimacy of large-scale business and legal
actions - fairness is a product of both substance and procedure.
Recognizing this, major areas of the law endorse opt-outs. Google
Book Search is not the first, and certainly will not be the last
digital indexing service to raise copyright concerns.
The
controversy stirred by this project exposes copyright’s lack of
recognition for fair procedures like opt-outs. Valuable economic
activity and important social gains will be realized through the
recognition in copyright law of procedural fair use.

